Religion appears capable of supplying law's moral compass. 4 Or moral guidance as firm and definitive may derive from a secular source. This essay will examine American law's commitment to the secular approach with particular reference to the current debate over creationism in the public school curriculum.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Ratified in 1791, the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution begins: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . ."5 This is termed the Establishment Clause. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has extended Establishment Clause constraints on state governments and their subdivisions. 7 The Clause is thought to prevent government favoritism of religious over secular concerns or favoritism of one religion over another. 8 Among the numerous settings for Establishment Clause litigation, 9 have been the religion-based attempts by state and local governments either to block teaching of the biological theory of evolution 10 in public schools or to diminish the effects of such teaching. Evolutionary theory provoked religious opposition from many Christians because it conflicted with the biblical account of living things created by God in unchanging form," and because it suggested the age of the earth was far greater than theologians estimated by using 4. Thus, "principled constitutionalism" can be "constructed on the foundation of institutionalized religion." Larry Cata Backer, 12. Christian theologians computing all of the time mentioned in the bible determined the age of the earth to be about 6000 years. "If the Bible was literally true . . . [tihis was nowhere near enough time for evolution to take place." Evans & Selina, supra note 10, at 12.
13. "Creationism is the belief that plants and animals were originally created by a supernatural being substantially as they now exist. Proponents of creationism today are primarily evangelical Christians who adopt a literal reading of the book of Genesis of the Bible." John G. West, Creationism, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 706 (2nd ed. 2000). By this view, "Scripture" is taken "to be a special revelation from God himself, demanding our absolute trust and allegiance. he Court found that the challenged laws were intended to protect and further a religious understanding of human origins. As such they had the purpose of advancing and endorsing religion over irreligion, thereby conferring benefits on religion that were deliberately discriminatory and constitutionally impermissible. Conkle, id, at 169-170.
legislation. Edwards currently provides the Supreme Court's last word on religion in the public school curriculum.
To some religious believers, [Edwards] embodies the hostility to all things religious to which the contemporary Court has led the Constitution, the regrettable triumph of secularism over faith. To others, such a result represents nothing more than the reality that the Constitution insists that religiously driven messages be disseminated in venues other than the American public school. These differing cultural perspectives likely will not reconcile anytime soon. For now, however, [Establishment Clause] principles cast shadows of constitutional doubt over efforts to use the institutions of public education to inculcate students with a view of mankind's origins that comports with the view espoused by religious teachings.' 8 The creationist response to Edwards has been to regroup once more. This latest initiative has been to offer in the public school curriculum a theory in opposition to evolution called Intelligent Design. Intelligent Design is like earlier creationist positions in rejecting biological concepts of evolution and natural selection. It is careful, however, to avoid reference to biblical sources or to the existence of a divine supernatural being. Proponents advance Intelligent Design as a rival scientific theory.' 9 It rests on "the argument that certain features of the natural world are so complex and intricately put together that they must have been deliberately fashioned." 2 0 The legitimacy of intelligent design is debated within the scientific community, 2 1 while its constitutional viability is debated among legal scholars. 22 
II. THE VIEW FROM THE OUTSIDE
Little of the U.S. Constitution is explicit or self-applying. The Supreme Court derives much of its considerable power from its professed need to expound on the meaning of a few words of constitutional text in order to resolve particular controversies before it. 24 The Supreme Court thereby makes most of our constitutional law though judicial doctrine and in increments-determining the rational effect of prior cases on new case facts. This means that the constitutional law making process of the Court moves in starts and stops as the court grapples with the facts-including the quirks and idiosyncrasies-of each new controversy.
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence bears this out. The only meaning clear from the text alone is that it bars creation of an official government religion. "Beyond the consensus on this indisputable proposition, however, much remains up for grabs among the justices regarding the precise contours of the anti-establishment principle." 25 Doctrine applicable to the creationism question suffers from uncertainties of constitutional history 2 6 and from the failure to adequately define "religion." 27 It is impossible to grapple with these It should be noted that the result shared by Epperson, Edwards, and the cases above-that religious purpose in public school teaching violates the Establishment Clause-might suggest far more clarity and continuity in judicial doctrine than actually exists. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text, infra. interior concerns of the structure and fabric of Establishment Clause doctrine 2 8 within the space permitted here. But I can take a different perspective that my international readers may find at least as interesting: a view from the outside. I will devote the balance of the paper to some thoughts on the larger social, political, and legal significance of the Supreme Court's creationism cases.
While religious antagonism toward scientific theory has long existed, 29 science has never been antagonistic toward religion. Rather it is indifferent to it, as it is to all moral concerns. Natural science is preoccupied with the physical world. It is usually enough for scientific theory to state and support a causal rule, viz, to explain why a particular phenomenon occurs and will repeat itself. 3 0 Lofty moral questions-religious or secular-have no place in science. 3 1 They are uninteresting to scientists because they "cannot be tested and proved in the same way that an hypothesis in physics or chemistry can be falsified or verified." 3 2
Consider the Copernican Revolution. The discovery that the earth was merely one of several planets revolving around the sun assaulted the belief in "the earth as the unique and focal center of God's creation." 3 3 While they were denounced as satanic figures, neither Copernicus nor Galileo set out to affect religion. Copernicus only wanted to simplify astronomical theory and make it more accurate. He found he could do this "by transferring to the sun many astronomical functions previously attributed to the earth." 34 Galileo intended to advance no religious point of view in developing the telescope. But he "popularized astronomy, and the astronomy that [he] popularized was Copernican." 3 5 Perhaps the indifference of scientists to the damaging effects their discoveries can have on religious belief is as infuriating to some religious persons as if scientists set out to do them harm. This appears true for the biological theory of evolution, which remains highly controversial today. A recent news report disclosed that "[a] British Amendment purposes, but the Supreme Court has never spoken authoritatively on the issue.").
28. Examples of such scholarship appear in note 22, supra.
29.
In "about 450 B.C., Anaxagoras shocked conservative opinion in Athens by declaring that the sun and the moon were red-hot stones, which meant they could not be divinities." S.G.F. Brandon The story went on to note that, according to a February Gallup poll, "only 39% of Americans believe in evolution." 3 7 This seems to bear out the observation of a distinguished First Amendment scholar that "there has been tremendous controversy concerning the topic of human origins and how it should be taught in the public schools." 3 8 We might ask then a couple of questions. Is it appropriate for the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the effect of its decisions on the public? And, if so, has the Court done so here?
Like all judges serving under Article Three of the U. S. Constitution, justices of the Supreme Court are appointed rather than elected and have their appointments for life. One can say that the strength of the Supreme Court lies precisely in the fact that it is protected from the wrath of public opinion and from the corresponding political pressure felt by the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. This does not mean however that the Court should be unconcerned about public reaction to its decisions. In the words of Alexander Bickel, " [b] road and sustained application of the Court's law, when challenged, is a function of its rightness, not merely of its pronouncement." 3 9 The public is entitled to ask-and constantly does ask-whether the Supreme Court's decisions improve society. The Court cannot flee from controversy. But we should be able to find in its controversial decisions vindication of clear principles that, to many at least, make the price of public outcry worth paying. The principles of racial equality in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 40 and of women's right to choose whether to have children in Roe v. Wade 41 are illustrations.
In contrast, the creationism cases have established little in the nature of principle. The First Amendment restricts only government action. It poses no ban on the teaching of creationism in private schools or to home-schooled children. Creationism can be included in even the public school curriculum. It is clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard that the Louisiana legislature would have been free to include a component on creationism is part of a required course on comparative religious thought or on contemporary social issues. Attempts to introduce creationism into the public school curriculum failed in Edwards and elsewhere only because creationism was to be taught as scientific fact. To be sure, it is commendable to protect public school students from scientific misinformation. This has been seen as an important contribution of the Court's creationism cases. 43 It is no more, however, than a fortunate side effect. We value public education in this country. 4 4 But, unlike freedom of expression, it does not enjoy the status of a constitutional right.4 5 Even the most backward secular misrepresentations in the public school curriculum-for example about the dangerous effects of fluoridation, the nonexistence of the Holocaust, or the historic absence of racial injustice4 6 -Would be unaffected by the Establishment Clause. They may not even be unconstitutional.47
It would be difficult to argue with the Supreme Court's decision in Epperson. If the Establishment Clause means anything beyond the bare words of the text, it must mean that government may not institute religious bans on public education. Beyond Epperson, however, the Establishment Clause principles become obscure and case results episodic. Creationism teaching in the private school classroom is unabated. And, even in public schools, the prerequisite for Establishment Clause application of a religious purpose leaves secular distortions of the curriculum unaddressed. If Edwards is not wrong, at least it fails to advance or even articulate a principle that justifies a result that many members of the public find disturbing.
